



Theories of Consciousness and Loneliness

Ben Lazare Mijuskovic

“We are lonely from the cradle to the grave—and perhaps beyond.”
(Joseph Conrad, *An Outcaste of the Islands*, 1896)

“Each man is like a nautilus, who lives in a house of his own making, and carries it around on his back.”
(Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*, 1939)

There is a distinction between *theoretical* research and *practical* application. *Theoretical* knowledge teaches the reasoning, the techniques, and the theory supporting the knowledge. By contrast, *practical* knowledge is gained by *doing* things; it is based on real life endeavors, situations, and tasks. For example, Freud’s writings elucidate his psychoanalytic theory and his teachings, while his therapeutic sessions were applications of his theory. Similarly, when I write articles and books about loneliness, I am creating a theory. And when I function as a therapist, I am applying and practicing my theory. Theory always precedes practice.

In what follows, I wish to establish four themes:

First theme: *that* all human beings are innately lonely; that the fear of loneliness is the universal *existential* condition of each of us, which motivates us in *all* our feelings, thoughts, and endeavors.

Second theme: *why* this is so, and I offer a theory of consciousness that assumes the mind is both immaterial and active; reflexively self-conscious (Kant) and transcendently intentional (Husserl).

Third theme: the *consequences* of loneliness, which directly involve the dynamics of hostility, anxiety, and depression leading to both destructive and self-destructive behaviors.

Fourth theme: *what* can be done about it; its remedies in terms of positively promoting empathy, which serves as the means to secure intimacy as its result.

First theme: Innate loneliness

The twin principles I propose to defend are that all we feel, think, say, and do occurs between the twin emotional and cognitive poles in human consciousness; between its self-conscious reflexive insularity (Kant) and the intentional desire to transcend loneliness (Husserl) by establishing empathy and intimacy with other self-conscious beings, whether divine, human, or animal. The two terminals of human feelings and thoughts, the intrinsic components of consciousness, which constitute the dynamics of repulsion and attraction, continually guide us through all our passions, thoughts, and actions.¹ After the biological drives for air, water, nourishment, sleep—and before sex (contra Freud)—are met, the most insistent psychological motivational drives in human beings is to avoid loneliness and secure an intimate relation to other self-conscious beings. In effect, I wish to replace Freud's principle of libidinal energy with the anxiety of human isolation.

Thesis: Ever since the dawn of Western Consciousness—the grief of a lost friendship in the *Epic of Gilgamesh*; the *Book of Job*, when God tests him; *Genesis* 2:18, when God decides man needs a “helpmate”; the ancient Greek myths and tragedies, as for example, Oedipus Rex and Oedipus at Colonus, Achilles and Patroclus, Castor and Pollux, Antigone, Prometheus, Deucalion and Pyrrha, Demeter and Persephone, Orpheus and Eurydice, and Sisyphus; Aristophanes' speech on love in Plato's *Symposium*; Books VIII and IX of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* based on friendship; Christ

“forsaken” on the Cross; and St. Augustine's *Confessions*—the tension between loneliness and intimacy has dominated philosophical and literary thought in the West. For Freud, the Greek myths exhibit man's true human nature as primarily motivated by sexual instincts and aggression. By contrast, I believe the Greek myths symbolize man's universal loneliness. For example, Aristophanes' speech provides a classical illustration of loneliness as it recounts the story of the original race of humans, which was very different from us today. The body consisted of two sets of legs and arms; a head with two faces looking in different directions; and two sexual organs: male-male; female-female; and female-male. They were very powerful and aggressive roly-polly creatures, destructive and mischievous. So much so, that one day, Zeus tired of their antics and split them in half: “So, you see gentlemen, ever since then each of us is seeking for our other half.”

First proof: The evidence *that* the fear of loneliness is innate can be demonstrated by citing the psychological research on very young children conducted by Rene Spitz in his studies on “hospitalized” infants diagnosed with anaclitic depression,² which shows that without sufficient emotional nurturance, infants will retreat back toward the womb, deteriorate emotionally, cognitively, physically, and even die. Over half of the deaths of institutionalized infants in England under the age of one died from loneliness and neglect during the First World War when their mothers were recruited to work in factories in order to help with the war effort (See also John Bowlby's, subsequent research on childhood “attachment disorders”).³

Second proof: The medical evidence attesting to the ravages of loneliness, especially on the heart in adults, but even in children, is amply documented as early as James Lynch's two studies, *The*

Broken Heart: The Medical Consequences of Loneliness (1975) and *A Cry Unheard: New Insights into the Medical Consequences of Loneliness* (2000).⁴

Third proof: Kant's philosophical insight that no human being would ever wish to be immortal at the price of being the only self-conscious creature in an entirely lifeless universe condemned to exist forever completely alone in the infinite and eternal expanses of space and time. "Carazan's Dream" tells the story of a miserly merchant who narcissistically cared for no one but himself, and one night in a dream the Angel of Death visited him and informed him that because of his lifelong disdain for his fellow man, he was doomed to be transported to the farthest and darkest corners of the universe to dwell there alone forever.

"Carazan... you have closed your heart to the love of humankind and held on to your treasures with an iron hand. You have only lived for yourself. And hence in the future you shall also live alone and excluded from all communion with the entirety of creation for eternity." (Kant, *Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime*, 1764)⁵

For many religious people, the ultimate terrifying separation is to be abandoned by God.

"Who will give me help so that I may rest in you? Who will help me, O' Lord, so that you will come into my heart and inebriate it, to the end that I may forget my evils and embrace you, my one good? What are you to me? Have pity on me, so that I may speak. What am I myself to you that you command me to love you and grow angry and threaten me with mighty woes unless I do?" (St. Augustine, *The Confessions of St. Augustine*)⁶

But to be deserted by those we love on this earth is for many of us is just as frightening.

Second theme: *A priori* loneliness

Why are we *a priori*, i.e. necessarily, universally, and innately lonely?

This directly involves the metaphysical conflict between the brain versus consciousness. The issue both historically and conceptually begins with Plato's prescient allusion to the "Battle between the Giants against the Gods" (*Sophist*, 245e; Cornford, 1964);⁷ and more specifically it addresses the ultimate question: whether senseless matter *alone* can think?⁸ It represents the conflict between two warring camps; materialists defending (a) the Brain (Science) pitted against both those championing (b) the Soul (e.g., Christianity) and (c) the Mind (Humanism). It involves the perennial cosmic struggle between, on the one side, the philosophic forces of materialism (all that exists is matter *plus* motion; Democritus); mechanism (both the world and man operate like a machine; Hobbes); determinism (every event consists of a chain of inflexible causes and effects; Descartes); empiricism (all our ideas are derived from precedent sensations, i.e. experience; Locke); phenomenalism (both the self and the world are merely constructions of passively "given" mental impressions; Hume); behaviorism (all human conduct can be reduced to bodily stimuli and responses; Ryle, Armstrong, Dennett); and the current neurosciences (the brain is analogous to a computer and externally programmed); all of which theories are aligned with the interests of science (Caccioppo).

Since the 1970's, the studies on loneliness have favored the current dominance of the neurosciences, coupled with a therapeutic alliance with psychiatric medications as "the drug of choice" in the English-speaking world. In opposition, my theoretical journey has decidedly flowed against this current.

By contrast, I promote dualism (there are only two substances,

extended matter and immaterial souls (b above; Plato, St. Augustine, Descartes); or immaterial minds (c above; Aristotle, Hume, Sartre); rationalism (some truths are known by reason alone independently of experience; Descartes, Leibniz, Kant); idealism (all that exists is mental, mind-dependent, or spiritual; G.E. Moore); freedom (man exhibits either an ethical free will or an epistemic spontaneity); phenomenology (consciousness is intentional, meaning intending; Husserl); and existentialism (man creates values for himself alone; Sartre). The struggle between the two camps and the three subdivisions exists today and promises to continue undiminished into the future. It pits Democritus against Plato; Epicurus against Plotinus; Atheists and Sceptics against St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas; Lorenzo Valla against Marsilio Ficino; Hobbes against Descartes; Locke against Leibniz; Hume against Kant; Marx against Hegel; and so on. The critical difference between Christianity and Humanism is that the first posits the immortality of the soul whereas the second does not.

According to Aristotle, philosophy is a search for “first principles,” ultimate assumptions. For Pascal, “the heart has its reasons which the head does not know”; for Fichte, first principles are the result of our personal “inclinations and interests”; for Kierkegaard our “paradoxical faith”; for Nietzsche our “Will to Power”; and for William James our “passional natures.” But for each of us, ultimately, a first principle can only be underived; it’s always only an assumption. It can never be “proved.”

I believe the “solution” to loneliness lies in the second set of principles, supports, and perspectives in opposition to those composing the materialist complex. It lies in the positions of metaphysical dualism; subjective idealism; and ontological existentialism. In all its aspects, it stands against the naivete of

science, what Husserl criticized as “the natural outlook.” Loneliness is grounded in the intrinsic nature of human consciousness itself. The brain is physical, reactionary, responsive to external stimuli but the mind is immaterial, spontaneously active, reflexive, and intentional.

This paradigm of consciousness can apply to theistic religions as well as to non-religious humanism. And it can also apply both to religious existentialists (Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Paul Tillich, Martin Buber, and Gabriel Marcel) as well as to atheistic existentialists (Nietzsche, Albert Camus, and Jean-Paul Sartre). Existentialism is the thesis that the universe is (a) intrinsically meaningless; (b) that each individual is radically free to create meanings and values for herself or himself alone; and (c) consequently that each of us is irredeemably lonely (Sartre: “Existentialism Is a Humanism”). Indeed, absolute loneliness is the necessary and universal prerequisite for our radical freedom. Neither the dictates of God; nor a “universal” human nature; nor the conventions of society can command our values and decisions. It is the free self alone that decides (existential anxiety).

All materialists, empiricists, phenomenologists, behaviorists, and neuroscientists assume that the brain is a physical entity, passively *caused*, and therefore essentially a “programmed” object; it consists of 100 billion neurons and electrical “causal” synapses. It is a “computer”; and hence programmed externally.⁹ Language replaces consciousness. In this material world, both nature and man are determined. The emphasis on the reduction to the brain alone often leads solely to the use of psychiatric medications in addressing loneliness. When I retired from the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, we only provided six therapy sessions for patients before referring, i.e. “farming them

out” to their medical doctor for meds. This therapeutic regimen is ludicrously inadequate to address the deep issues of loneliness.

By contrast, all dualists, rationalists, idealists, phenomenologists, and existentialists assume as a first principle that the human mind is not only active and immaterial but also either ethically free or epistemically spontaneous. Within Christianity, for example, God not only creates time and space, the entire universe, but also each individual soul *ex nihilo*. None of the ancient Greeks believed in creation out of nothing, not the Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, or the Stoics.

By contrast, according to both St. Augustine and Descartes, man is endowed with an ethical free will, which is separate from his intellect, as attested in Descartes’s Fourth Meditation,¹⁰ while by contrast humanists, contend that there is a creative “spontaneity”—rather than free will—which plays a very different role in both our passionate and intellectual makeup. This means that the latter’s reactions to loneliness are absolutely subjective and spontaneous, i.e. free, unpredictable but productive as confirmed by Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Judgment*, Fichte’s *Science of Knowledge* and *Vocation of Man*, Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, Husserl’s *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, Bergson’s *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, and Sartre’s *Transcendence of the Ego*.¹¹ Again, these tripartite classifications then proliferate into three distinct paradigms: Scientific; Religious (e.g. Christianity); and Humanistic. In turn, it establishes first the paradigms of the brain and science (Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, Hobbes and the current neurosciences [Ryle, Armstrong, Dennett]); second the soul and Christianity (St. Augustine, Descartes, Leibniz); and third the mind and humanism (Aristotle, Hume and Sartre). Each of these three dominating first

principles and paradigms has its own unique—and forceful—manner of addressing loneliness.

Literature, as I emphasized in the beginning of this text, paid lavish homage to the theme of loneliness as early as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* of Homer. But both philosophy and psychology only recently addressed it within the province of “existentialism” and the companionship of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. And this interest was only accorded this importance as a result of our horror following the Second World War. We were forced to consider man in a much darker light. Thus, it is only since the 1970’s when philosophers and psychologists very belatedly realized the importance of loneliness. But unfortunately, as matters now stand, the recent studies have greatly favored the current dominance of the neurosciences in the English-speaking world, which, as I mentioned, is now coupled with their “therapeutic” alliance in behalf of psychiatric medications. My own theoretical journey strongly flows against this powerful current.

As matters now stand, most current researchers studying loneliness believe it is externally caused by familial, environmental, cultural, situational, and even chemical imbalances in the brain and therefore transient, avoidable, and curable. Today’s psychoanalysts, cognitive behavioral therapists, and neuroscientists uniformly assume validity of the principle of psychological causality thus allowing for both prediction and (presumably) control. By contrast, I argue that loneliness is “constituted” from within consciousness by the innate synthetic *a priori* activities of the mind; by the spontaneity of consciousness itself, and it is therefore unpredictable and uncontrollable. Because the first group believes in determinism—as opposed to free will or epistemic spontaneity—they are convinced that loneliness can be predicted, controlled,

and “cured,” that it is essentially a classifiable medical disorder (Interestingly, the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders* does not list it).¹² Psychoanalysts believe that childhood traumatic experiences cause neurotic symptoms. Behaviorists and cognitive behavioral therapists assume that humans are conditioned by stimulus-response mechanisms in the brain and then relayed to the body’s central nervous system. Current neuroscientists analogize the “mind” to a computer; the brain is programmed from without, cellular neurons and synapses cause physical behaviors, and “intelligence” is reducible to a conventional artificial language composed of arbitrary symbols. Language *replaces* consciousness (again, Wittgenstein, Armstrong, Dennett). I wish to challenge these assumptions with assumptions of my own.

The human mind displays two complementary critical functions or activities: it (a) separates and distinguishes sensations, feelings, concepts, and judgments; and then it (b) unifies, binds, and synthesizes sensations, feelings, concepts, and judgments (This capacity is also shared by some higher order animals).

Loneliness is negatively defined and structured by seven critical forms of separation; and, by contrast, it is positively defined and structured by the unification of empathic acts resulting in intimacy, as we previously indicated.

There are seven developmental stages or levels of separation in human consciousness. Separation is the origin of loneliness.

The first stage of separation is the fetus’ biological ejection from the womb (physical and painful object-object separation). Interestingly, it represents Freud’s initial state of anxiety and it constitutes the initial acknowledgment of *subconscious*—*not* unconscious—loneliness.

“Here is once again the same situation as that which underlay the first great anxiety-state of birth and the infantile anxiety of longing [i.e. intimacy]—the anxiety due to separation from the protecting mother.” (Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, 1923)¹³

The second stage of separation is preliminary to the third stage of separation of the ego from its objects, which is described by Freud as an “oceanic feeling”:

“[O]riginally the ego includes everything. Later it separates off an external world from itself [our third stage]. Our present ego-feeling is therefore only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive—indeed an all-embracing—feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it. We may assume that there are many people in whose mental life this primary ego-feeling has persisted to a greater or lesser degree... In that case, the ideational contents appropriate to it would be precisely those of limitlessness and of a bond with the universe—the... *oceanic*.” (Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 1930)¹⁴

The oceanic feeling is the ultimate origin of primary narcissism, of feelings—not concepts—of omnipotence, self-sufficiency, and entitlement. I say primary because at this level, there is nothing to oppose it. It also corresponds to the stage of immediate, amorphous Sense Certainty described in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and William James’ description of *immediate*, i.e. non-relational infant consciousness.

“... the undeniable fact being that *any number of impressions, from any number of sensory sources, falling simultaneously on a mind, which has not yet experienced them separately, will fuse into a single undivided object for that mind...*The baby assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin and entrails at once feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion.” (James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, his emphasis)¹⁵

Narcissism, emanating, “arising” from the fount of the “oceanic feeling,” is the ultimate source of loneliness with its compulsive obsessional desires for instant gratifications.

The third stage of separation occurs when the infant emotionally and cognitively separates itself from the external world (subject-object separation, which equals the first true initial moment of self-consciousness). This occurs in Kant when the self actively distinguishes its self from a world of inanimate objects.¹⁶ In order to be *self*-conscious, the self must be able to distinguish its self, to separate its self from the world of objects. The subject-object relation is mutually constituted in *self*-consciousness as a synthetic *a priori* relation. This also corresponds to Hegel’s category of Perception in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.¹⁷

Similarly, in Freud the infant transitions from the unbounded feeling of undifferentiated oneness, the totality of its previous state of consciousness, as it experiences the “oceanic feeling,” by relating its consciousness to the mother’s breast as an inanimate object. In the beginning, the baby in the crib reaches out to touch the moon only to realize that it is not a part of its body. But with the mother’s breast, it begins to realize the difference, the separation, and the relation between its own self against inanimate objects.

Freud speculates on this earliest of all stages of human self-consciousness:

“Further reflections tell us that the adult’s *ego-feeling* cannot have been the same from the beginning. It must have gone through a process of development, which cannot, of course, be demonstrated but which admits of being constructed with a fair degree of probability. An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him. He gradually learns to do so in various promptings. He must be

very strongly impressed by the fact that some sources of excitation, which he will later recognize as his own bodily organs, can provide him with sensations at any moment, whereas other sources evade him from time to time—among what he desires most of all his mother’s breast—and only reappear as a result of his screaming for help. In this way, there is for the first time set over against his ego an *object* in the form of something that exists *outside* of his consciousness and which is only forced to appear by a special action.” (Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 1930)¹⁸

This “constitutes” a subjective reality principle within the child. More specifically, it is structured as “an ego<>desire<>object” dynamic. At this stage of the child’s development, loneliness is essentially *intra-psychic*; separation occurs “inside the self.” There is as yet no other self. The baby yearns for the breast unaware that it is attached to a *person* in the same fashion in which it might miss its lost teddy bear. Hence the child fears separation from desired objects. The self is object-dependent. The infant distinguishes and feels separated from *valued* objects as no longer under his control, like his misplaced pacifier; and he feels angry and anxious when he is separated from desired special objects, especially what he wishes for and fantasizes about above all else, his mother’s breast.¹⁹

For both Kant and Freud, self-consciousness is relationally constituted—not caused or externally conditioned—by the self/subject-inanimate/object relation, i.e. intra-personally. While for Hegel, in contrast to Kant, the self is mutually conditioned by its relation to an *other* self. Hegel’s self is constituted as a social relation as opposed to an intra-psychic one.

The fourth stage of separation occurs when the loneliness becomes *inter-personal*. In Hegelian terms, the child’s narcissistic ego *dialectically* separates its own self from the mother’s self, thus generating conflicts of self-assertion, resistance, defiance, and

hostility toward the opposing “other” self; in this instance, the mother, who is an uncertain responding self in relation to the child (self/ego versus other-self/ego separation). This constitutes the fear of loneliness as a separation from a desired and special, unique other self.

Now the breast becomes something complicating and frustrating. It is something the mother can offer or withhold at will, thus creating interpersonal conflicts and generating in the child a vacillation between fear and anger, fear and anxiety, and fear and depression, thus leading to the dynamics of loneliness. The latter corresponds to Hegel’s conflicted relation between Master and Slave, Lordship and Bondage; it is a “battle to the death” for narcissistic self-assertion and recognition at the expense of the other self. It also corresponds to Hegel’s stage of social self-consciousness generated by conflicts between other separate self-consciousnesses, e.g., mother and child; siblings and child.²⁰ For Hegel, this is (a) the source of *social* self-consciousness as opposed to *personal* self-consciousness (self-object relation in Kant). But it is also the origin of personal conflicts with other selves leading to social separations and loneliness. In empiricism, this description corresponds to Hobbes’ depiction of man’s life as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”; “a war of all against all”; “wherein everyman is an enemy to every man.”²¹

The fifth stage of separation is psychosis/madness/insanity, when the self is separated within its own consciousness; it stands against its own self as well as against external reality. The subject-object relation disintegrates and the internal fragmentation of the self becomes constituted by the inability of the self to come to terms within its own self; it is a forced, self-inflicted injury brought about by its desperate loneliness and its struggle to create

an alternate and more satisfying and fantastic protection against loneliness.

“[T]he feeling soul in its struggle with the immediacy of its substantial content to raise itself to the self-related simple subjectivity present in the *I* whereby it becomes completely self-possessed and conscious of its self, separates its self from itself...the mind, which is shut up within itself, has sunk into itself and consists in being no longer in immediate contact with reality but in having positively separated itself from its self.” (Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, 1817, my emphasis)²²

Under the extreme pressures of loneliness, the self separates its self from reality and even from—and against—its own self; it tries to control the loneliness within by creating an internal realm of illusory and delusional fantasies in order to counteract the despair. Unable to deal with intense and/or prolonged loneliness, the mind separates its self from the social world dominated by others as it narcissistically retreats both into and within its own self (cf. Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*).²³ I recall, when “treating” schizophrenics it soon became obvious how difficult it is to penetrate, to enter within their protected spheres of consciousness.

The sixth stage of separation is from values (as opposed to objects or other selves). It consists of a separation from ethical, aesthetic, and/or religious values; from previously supportive “ways of life,” which are forcibly abandoned because of racial or gender or class prejudice; from familiar cultural customs; by divorce; unemployment; migration; global wars; atrocities; holocausts; etc.

The seventh and final stage of separation is death; it is the soul’s separation from life, with the ultimate and consequent realization that each of us dies all alone and that the world will go on uncaringly without us (cf. Tolstoy, *The Death of Ivan Ilyich*; in Thomas Hardy’s *Tess of the D’Urbervilles* and the *Mayor of Casterbridge*,

both characters in the end wish to be buried in unmarked graves, as if they had never existed).

“[Death] is a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for *internal* reasons—becomes inorganic once again—then we shall be compelled to say that *the aim of all life is death* and looking backwards, that *inanimate things existed before living ones*.” (Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 1920)²⁴

Once more, what remains critically important in all these modes of separation is the synthetic *a priori* relation between primary narcissism<>loneliness<>hostility.

Freud’s conception of the narcissistic ego is the ultimate source of loneliness and its natural impulses for dominance are often self-destructive and unforgiving when they fail.

“But how can the sadistic instinct, whose aim it is to injure the object [i.e. other self] be derived from Eros, the preserver [and unifier] of life? Is it not plausible to suppose that this sadism is in fact a death instinct [the principle of Thanatos], which, under the influence of the narcissistic libido, has been forced away from the ego and has consequently only emerged in relation to the object? It now enters in the service of the sexual function. During the oral stage of organization of the libido, the act of obtaining erotic mastery over an object [by aggressively biting the mother’s breast] coincides with that object’s destruction.” (Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 1920)²⁵

And again:

“We have given it the name of narcissism. The subject behaves as though he were in love with himself; his egoistic instincts and his libidinal wishes are not yet separable... We suspect already that this narcissistic organization is never wholly abandoned. [Indeed!] A human being remains to some extent narcissistic even when he has found external objects for his libido.” (Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 1950, my exclamation)²⁶

Again, it all begins with the oceanic feeling and its empowerment of primary narcissism.

“[T]he original stage of narcissism [begins with the oceanic feeling] in which the childish ego enjoyed self-sufficiency.” (Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 1921)²⁷

But narcissism always desires mastery over the other consciousness.²⁸

It is critical to understand that Freud’s unconscious is mnemonic; it is accessible, retrievable by free association and the interpretation of dreams. His unconscious, although hidden, is in principle retrievable by and through memory. And Freud is a determinist. Presumably, by reexperiencing the original traumas, the ego gains insight, control, and relief over his symptoms.

By contrast, Kant’s *epistemic subconscious* is spontaneous and inaccessible, irretrievable; it is the source for *how* consciousness itself is generated, created *below* self-consciousness and even below Freud’s mnemonic unconscious.²⁹ However, Schopenhauer’s spontaneous *affective subconscious is the irrational Will*; it is the subterranean source for the deepest narcissism, egoism, and ultimately evil.³⁰ This is precisely what civilization and culture must protect against and from.

Third theme: The consequences of loneliness

The first significant article written on loneliness as a subject matter in its own right is by a psychoanalyst, Gregory Zilboorg. In his 1938 article, “Loneliness,” Zilboorg, who was quite familiar with Kant’s philosophy, was the first to draw a clear synthetic *a priori* relation between narcissism<>loneliness<>hostility.³¹ In

the article, he recounts the myth of Narcissus, an uncommonly handsome young man so attractive that all the maidens desired him. But they meant nothing to him. Poor Echo was so distraught that she pined away until nothing was left but her voice. And, so the goddess Nemesis decided to punish him and when he gazed into a reflective pool of water he fell in love with his own image and drowned. The point is that narcissism is intrinsically destructive; it is both a danger to others as well as to the self. In the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, a Narcissistic Personality disorder is essentially defined as an incorrigible and unrepentant life-long disorder;³² and it is closely related to Antisocial Personality disorders, which are individuals who lack a moral conscience.³³

Zilboorg then argues that when an infant is unduly pampered and spoiled, it develops powerful feelings of entitlement, delusions of grandeur, and megalomaniacal symptoms that will generate feelings of hostility whenever its desires are thwarted. If these feelings are not resolved, it frequently turns to murder followed by suicide. This violent reaction is equally true of groups as it is of nations.³⁴ Obviously, as early as 1933, Zilboorg would already have been writing with full awareness of the impending dangers of Hitler and Nazism. Similarly, Hannah Arendt, in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, blames the humiliation and the punishment suffered by Germany's national pride after the defeat in the First World War for leading to Nazism and Hitler, as well Italian Fascism (Mussolini), and later Communism (i.e. Stalin).³⁵ But the salient point is that whenever human desires are blocked and impeded, the reaction is anger—not anxiety or depression; those only follow later and if they are not resolved they will lead to acts of compulsive and obsessional revenge.

The second significant article on loneliness was by another psychoanalyst, Frieda Fromm-Reichman. Again, it is titled simply “Loneliness” and she identifies it with anxiety: its meaning is *identical* to anxiety, and when it is severe, it is closely related to the inability to communicate, to reach others, and the conviction that no one is listening because no one cares.³⁶

The third psychoanalyst writing on loneliness was Eric Fromm, who forged a corresponding synthetic *a priori* connection between loneliness, guilt, and shame.³⁷ All this leads to the result that loneliness can be conceptually viewed as a synthetic *universal meaning*; that it constitutes a genus-to-species relation, which includes Hegel's dialectical discussion of the meaning of *alienation* in his “Lordship and Bondage” section leading to Marx; and his *estrangement* section in the “Unhappy Consciousness” section leading to Kierkegaard in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.³⁸ Loneliness has many faces and myriad expressions, including fear, hostility, anxiety, depression, jealousy, despair, neglect, abandonment, betrayal, rejection, guilt, shame, rage, humiliation, defeat, etc.

Currently in the United States there is an epidemic of killings conventionally described by the Press as “senseless,” “meaningless,” and “motiveless” acts. But I submit they are not motiveless at all. Indeed, they are all-too “motivefull.” They are fueled and animated by narcissistic loneliness; by an anger fraught with desperation when the self's narcissistic desires have failed, and the only recourse is to indiscriminately punish others for one's loneliness regardless of the consequences.

Fourth theme: The remedy for loneliness

Aristotle supposedly defines friendship as one soul dwelling in two bodies, but certainly every meaningful concept must have a meaningful opposite. The opposite of loneliness is not love, rather it is intimacy. Love is one-sided; I can love someone who does not love me. By contrast, intimacy is grounded on feelings and acts of *mutual* empathy. But empathy must be distinguished from sympathy and/or pity, which are both superficial, one-sided, and non-interactive. The concept of empathy was first formulated by Theodor Lipps as an *aesthetic* relation between the self and the admired object. It means that the aesthetic pleasure is derived when the subject (the observer) actively *projects* her or his own feelings *into* the object, when the observer enters *within* the artistic expression by identifying with its harmony, proportions, balance, beauty, grace, vibrancy, freedom of movement, etc., and when the observer identifies, participates and is emotionally infused by the dancer's flowing motions.³⁹ But in Lipps, the projection is one sided; it is thrust forward from the self toward the object. There is no suggestion that the directional target of that attention derives any reciprocal benefit from the observer's concentration or interest.

Significantly, Husserl, in the Fourth and Fifth Meditations of *Cartesian Meditations*,⁴⁰ attempts to exploit Lipps' principle and paradigm in order to solve the classical problem of Cartesian solipsism, namely that I can only *know* that I alone exist; that everyone else is only a dubitable imaginary figment in my mind. This creates the paradox that if all I can know is my own mind, then any other "self" is a mere illusion. And if *only* I can think, then loneliness becomes a meaningless concept, a contradiction

in terms. In order to salvage the problem of other minds, Husserl invokes Lipps' empathy. We *mediate* (as opposed to immediately, intuitively, eidetically), "analogically," "ap-presentationally," and therefore *inferentially* place our body in the place of the body of "the other self." But this will never do because this maneuver is inferential, i.e. a *mediate* relation and therefore dubitable. I *know* my mind, but I can only *infer* yours.

The solution to loneliness requires a new definition of empathy, which truly leads to intimacy. It must be immediately, eidetically, and intuitively meant, that is, intended; it must be experienced *simultaneously* by both selves; reciprocally, between and within both minds. True intimacy firstly must be *mutually* shared, intersubjectively, interactively with the other self and grounded through empathy. Empathy depends on feelings of *mutual* trust; *mutual* age appropriate respect; and *mutual* affection. And secondly, it must depend on a *mutual* sharing of feelings, meanings, and values. For example, consider a young couple, who has just experienced the death of their only child. Their overwhelming grief is mutual. Or an elderly couple devoted to each other throughout a long life being told that one of them has just been diagnosed with terminal cancer. Intimacy and empathy are ethical relations, not merely psychological ones. In addition, empathy also secures Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative, which commands treating the other self *better* than your own self; it stresses intentions and personal sacrifice over narcissism. Intimacy means both parties have mutual *duties* to the other self, a concept derived from the ancient Stoics.⁴¹ In terms of the overarching *quality* of intimate relationships, there are two imperative requirements: (1) *ethical* (as opposed to egoistic and narcissistic) *commitment* to the other self (and consequently the abrogation of the Master-Slave dialectic); and (2) constant communication between the two selves.

Loneliness and architecture

The current approach of the neurosciences in relation to loneliness is woefully inadequate and limited. It reduces all reality to a single *quantitative* feature: *matter in motion*. But humanism denies that reality is reducible to, identical with, and/or explainable by just matter and motion *alone*. Science deals with extended material quantities, thus eliminating (an) the entire sphere of active, purposeful, and intentional consciousness; and by annihilating the entire realm of ideal *qualitative* values, including ethical and aesthetic values. Values then merely become relative and subjective, i.e. fictional.

The critical error and inconsistency of science is that it confesses that many eternities ago, *all* material existence was lifeless (e.g., Freud above). But at a certain uncaused and spontaneous juncture in nature (Epicurean chance?), a single act inexplicably produced living matter. Or it “emanated” (Plotinus); it “arose” from “dead” matter. Just so, humanism believes that consciousness has similarly emanated, arisen from animate nature. The consequence of this chance organic/ideal complex event is that the issue of loneliness must be addressed by inter-disciplinary principles, approaches, and methods in order to gain insight and understanding into the dynamics of loneliness and intimacy. Accordingly, anything that contributes to a comprehensively unified and positive interdisciplinarity between the self and its environment is to be welcomed.

Kant discusses architecture in his 1790 treatise on aesthetics, *The Critique of Judgement*, which deals with “disinterested judgments of taste.”⁴² By “disinterested,” Kant means that the interests of the ego are suspended. For example, if I’m speculating on art as a financial investment, that would be obviously an extrinsic interest.

Art is intrinsically *expressive* and intrinsically pleasant and in fact *therapeutic*. It pleases “in itself.” Kant distinguishes two forms of art. The sublime *expresses* itself through the boundlessness of nature, in the starry heavens above and in the violence and majesty of a sea storm that pleases so long as we are not in danger. By contrast, the beautiful is *expressed* through distinct objects within definite lines of demarcation. The three forms of art are architecture, sculpture, and painting. And all art, according to Aristotle, involves production, manufacturing, making. We enjoy the “expressed” only insofar as we can recreate the feelings and the “making” depicted.

The guiding principle of therapeutic art is that it addresses loneliness by asking for nothing beyond itself; its therapeutic value consists entirely in its ability to lose the self by being completely absorbed, consumed by the natural event (the sublime) or by the object (the beautiful). In short, by *contemplation*.

There is a faculty of [aesthetic] taste for judging an object in reference to the imagination’s *free conformity to law*. Now, if in the judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, it is not regarded empirically as reproductive [i.e. imitative], as it is subject to the laws of association of ideas, but as *creative and spontaneous*, in short the product of genius.⁴³

Kant describes the *quality* of the judgment of appreciation of taste in teleological terms as a “purposiveness without a specific purpose.”⁴⁴ Again, it delights in-itself. The ego loses its self; it disappears and loneliness is extinguished. Unlike science, art concentrates on the *qualitative*—as opposed to the quantitative—on the features of the experience. Nevertheless, although the source of the enjoyment is subjective, the informed aesthetic judgment is expected to be “objective” and universally confirmed as either sublime or beautiful. Good taste is not relative.

Similarly, Schopenhauer, in *The World as Will and Representation* (1819),⁴⁵ following Kant, separates the phenomenal, empirical world into an essentially scientific realm composed of the intuitions of space and time, but instead of his predecessor's dozen categories of synthetic *a priori* relations, he reduces them to the single one of causality. Every event is reduced to a determinist causal necessity, physical and/or psychological. By contrast to Kant's *subconscious* epistemic spontaneity, Schopenhauer's is a *subconscious* affective spontaneity: it is an irrational, inaccessible, impermeable, dark, and fathomless Will. Whereas Kant postulates the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul for ethical purposes, Schopenhauer claims the Will, as a noumenal thing-in-Itself, is an unknowable reality, which ultimately serves as the source of all that exists and occurs in our realm of appearances. The closest approach—but indirect—is through the mediation of art: “All genuine art proceeds from knowledge of perception never from the concept.”⁴⁶ Perception serves as a figurative—but not a literal mediating—bridge between the phenomenal and the noumenal world. Our world is chock-full of misery, pain, suffering and narcissistic evil (contra Leibniz's claim that “this is the best of all possible worlds”). For Schopenhauer, it is the worst of all possible worlds.⁴⁷ But what mitigates all this suffering is art, which is disinterested and capable of achieving pure, i.e. will-less, contemplation and escaping “this veil of tears” by accessing a Platonic Realm of Eternal Ideas. According to Israel Knox, “Schopenhauer described beauty to be the quality of the world when contemplated, apart from all willing, for its own sake,” and “he distinctly anticipates the contemporary empathy (*Einfühlung*) theory [of art].”⁴⁸ Summarizing Schopenhauer's view on architecture, Knox goes on to say: “Architecture, therefore,

brings into clear distinction, some low-grade Ideas such as gravity, cohesion, rigidity, and hardness, those universal qualities of stone, those first, simplest, most important inarticulate manifestations of the Will.”⁴⁹ And in turn, “The truest stage of the Will achieves a peaceful result from the violence of the Will's inner nature.”⁵⁰

For Schopenhauer, we see the Will's inner nature revealing itself in discord; for, properly speaking, the conflict between gravity and rigidity—a form of objectification of the Will—resists the main problem for architecture, which is to make this conflict appear with perfect distinctness in many different ways. The beauty of a kind to be found in its activity is to display the forces of gravity and rigidity in the most distinct and yet varied manner. Against what architecture communicates to us is neither function, nor meaning, nor form but rather the existence of those fundamental forces of nature, the first Platonic Ideas, the lowest stages of the Will's objectivity. We recall that the entire Scientific Revolution was heralded by Newton's universal law of gravity. For Schopenhauer, architecture is the missing link between the realm of science and art; in turn, it is the most direct fusion of nature and Will.⁵¹

Thus, architecture represents the most immediate connection between the phenomenal world and the noumenal Will, the ontological link, the passage between the Great Chain of Being.⁵²

There are levels of reality as there are corresponding levels of cognition. As an advocate for Hinduism—all is Maya, all is Appearance—and Buddhism, Schopenhauer subscribes to the conviction that all life is suffering; all suffering is based in desire; all desire is based in the ego or self; eliminate the self and “you” will have annihilated all desire; even the desire not to desire.⁵³ Unlike science, which deals with spatial and temporal quantities and measurement, beauty deals with qualities. In the case of

architecture, the qualities of gravity, rigidity, light, and dynamism. This appreciation in the designs and the imagined manufacture of architectural edifices is what gives us a therapeutic aesthetic respite from the turbulence affecting the irrational narcissistic Will.

In the beginning of mankind, humans sought for a mate; then a family; then a tribe. And next to architecturally designing and manufacturing protections for themselves by building the walls of Ilium and medieval castles; and by erecting pyramids and medieval cathedrals, with their spires reaching to the heavens, as tributes to an existence beyond our present one. These monuments express both the fears and the aspirations of mankind.

In conclusion, there are numerous natural affiliations between disciplines that bear exploring and exploiting in our studies of loneliness, as for example between loneliness, architecture, and painting. During the Middle ages, the symbol of loneliness was poignantly conveyed by the painting of Christ's crucifixion. More currently, I believe Van Gogh's 28 self-portraits, confirmed by his letters of loneliness to his brother, Theo, underscores the depth of his sense of isolation. Closer to our own time, the connection between loneliness and architecture is powerfully displayed throughout Edward Hopper's paintings of deserted houses, buildings, lighthouses, restaurants, offices, railroad tracks going nowhere, empty rooms, and even lonelier individuals staring out into space and not talking to each other, looking past each other, lost and detached within their own inner worlds. Correspondingly, the works of Andrew Wyeth and his painting *Christina's World*, with her prone body lying in an open field and stretching out yearningly toward a deserted house, highlights the theme of loneliness, separation, and longing for home. Similarly, his painting *Chambered Nautilus*, of a solitary figure of a woman sitting upright

on a bed and staring wistfully out an open window, expresses the solitude of daydreams. Further, his multiple studies of open windows titled "Looking Out: Looking In" each serve as haunting metaphors for the Husserlian intentionality and Kantian reflexivity of consciousness. All these paintings can be used for therapeutic interventions for sharing our sense of loneliness with each other.

Notes

1. Ben Mijuskovic, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015).
2. Rene Spitz, "Hospitalism: An Inquiry into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood," *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 1 (1945), 53-74; cf. the videos: "Overt Primacy Rejection in Infancy," 1952: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02tW5K91_kY (accessed 3.2020) and "Emotional Deprivation in Infancy," 1952: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1eOpqV1fco> (accessed 3.2020). See also Floyd Ruch, *Psychology and Life* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1953). See also Rene Spitz, *The First Year of Life: A Psychoanalytic Study of Normal and Deviant Development of Object Relations* (New York: International Universities Press, 1965). The term "object relations" standing for other selves underscores the psychoanalytic custom of describing other selves as phenomenalist constructions of sense data.
3. John Bowlby, *Attachment and Loss* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), Volume I; and *Separation, Anxiety, and Anger* (London: Hogarth Press), Volume II. Lane Degregory, "Girl in the window," *Tampa Bay Times*, August 3, 2008: <https://projects.tampabay.com/projects/girl-in-the-window/danielle/> (accessed 2.2020).
4. James Lynch, *The Broken Heart: The Medical Consequences of Loneliness* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). James Lynch, *A Cry Unheard: New Insights into the Medical Consequences of Loneliness* (Baltimore: Bancroft Press, 2000). Cf. Margaret Mahler, Fred Pine, & Anni Bergman. *The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant: Symbiosis and Individuation* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 78-79, 111 and passim.
5. Immanuel Kant, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, edited and translated by Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011/1764).

6. St. Augustine. *The Confessions of St. Augustine* (New York: Doubleday, 1960). In Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the "Lord and Bondage" description, Marx's economic *alienation* is mirrored by the worker's sense of *separation* from nature; his work; the product of his labor; and his fellow man by competition (*Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts of 1844*). In his "Unhappy Consciousness" treatment, Hegel illustrates religious *estrangement* as man's *separation* from God, which is later reflected in Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. Ludwig Feuerbach, in *The Essence of Christianity*, argues that man projects his subjective self-consciousness into an illusory God in order to assuage his loneliness. Soren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986/1843).
7. Plato, *Sophist*, translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg: <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1735/1735-h/1735-h.htm> (accessed 3.2020), 245e. See also F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and The Sophist of Plato* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).
8. Ben Mijuskovic, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
9. Ben Mijuskovic, *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
10. Rene Descartes, *Philosophical Works of Descartes*, translated by E. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1931), Fourth and Fifth Meditations.
11. Ben Mijuskovic, *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2012). Ben Mijuskovic, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, CA.: Praeger, 2015). Ben Mijuskovic, "Cognitive and Motivational Roots of Loneliness," in *Addressing Loneliness: Coping, Prevention, and Clinical Interventions*, edited by Ami Sha'ked and Ami Rokach (New York: Routledge, 2015), 20-34. Mijuskovic, *Consciousness and Loneliness*, op. cit.
12. American Psychiatric Association. *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013, 5th edition).
13. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960/1923), Part V, 56.
14. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1961/1930), Part 1, 58.
15. William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1950/1890), Vol. I, 488. A corresponding passage occurs in Hegel's description of Sense-Certainty in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Sections 90-110. And both anticipate Freud's description of the "oceanic feeling." G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977/1807).
16. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1958/1787), A 107-110.
17. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, op. cit., sections 111-130.
18. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, op. cit., 10.
19. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, op. cit., sections 166-177.
20. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, op. cit., sections 178-196.
21. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Dent, 1931/1651), Chapter 13. The chapter corresponds to Hegel's stage of Civil Society in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Sections 586-589.
22. G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, translated by William Wallace and A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971/1817), Section 408 ff. Cf. Daniel Berthold-Bonds, *Hegel's Theory of Madness* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 20.
23. Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness* (New York: Doubleday, 1971/1899).
24. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1961/1920), 32.
25. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, op. cit., Part VI.
26. Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1950/1913), Part III:3, my exclamation.
27. Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1959/1921), Part 7.
28. Alexandre Kojeve, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, translated by James Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969/1947).
29. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., xvi-xvii.
30. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Volumes I and II, translated by E.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969/1819). Against Freud's retrievable, mnemonic unconscious, Schopenhauer's subconscious is irretrievable, intrinsically narcissistic, and the source of all the evil in the world, both physical and moral; I, 296, 313, 364; II, 171, 576, 583, 590.
31. Gregory Zilboorg, "Loneliness," *Atlantic Monthly*, January 1938, 1-15.
32. American Psychiatric Association. *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of*

- Mental Disorders* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013, 5th edition). 301.81.
33. American Psychiatric Association, op. cit., 301.7.
34. Zilboorg, "Loneliness," op. cit., 1-15.
35. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1968). Arendt cites Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin as examples of destructive loneliness. Ben Mijuskovic, "Loneliness and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 66: 4 (1979-80), 479-492.
36. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, "Loneliness," *Psychiatry: A Journal of Interpersonal Processes*, 22:1 (1959), 1-15; cf. Ben Mijuskovic, "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Psychiatry: A Journal of Interpersonal Processes*, 40:2 (1977), 113-131; reprinted in *The Anatomy of Loneliness*, edited by J. Hartog, J. Audi, and Y. Cohen (New York: International Universities Press, 1980), 65-94.
37. Eric Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971/1956).
38. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, op. cit.
39. Theodor Lipps, "Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense Feelings," in *A Modern Book of Esthetics: An Anthology*, edited by Melvin Rader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960/1903), 374-381.
40. Edmund Husserl, *The Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960/1931).
41. Ben Mijuskovic, "Loneliness and Intimacy," in *Intimate Autonomy: Autonomous Intimacy*, edited by B.J. Brothers (New York: Haworth Press, 1991), 38-48.
42. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, translated by J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishers, 1951/1790), Section 2.
43. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, op. cit., Section 22.
44. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, op. cit., Section 10.
45. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, op. cit.
46. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, op. cit., I, 57; II, 407-408.
47. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, op. cit., II, 582-583
48. Israel Knox, "Schopenhauer's Aesthetic Theory," in *Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement*, edited by Michael Fox (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 135, 140; cf. B.V. Kishan, "Schopenhauer on Buddhism," op. cit., 255-261; and R.K. Gupta, "Schopenhauer and Freud," op. cit., 226-235.

49. Knox, "Schopenhauer's Aesthetic Theory," Op. cit., 124.
50. Frederick Copleston, *Arthur Schopenhauer: Philosopher of Pessimism* (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1947).
51. W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, "Schopenhauer's Theory of Art," in *A Companion to Schopenhauer*, edited by B. Vandeabeebe (Cambridge: Wiley Blackwell, 2012), 181-185.
52. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, op. cit., I, 210, 214. Cf. A.O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea* (New York: Harper & Row, 1936).
53. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, op. cit., 252-253.

Definitions of propositions

- Analytic, *a priori*, universal and necessary: the relation between the subject term and the predicate term are identical, e.g. $2+3=5$; or "All bachelors are unmarried males."
- Synthetic, *a posteriori*: the relation between the subject term and the predicate term are contingent and particular, e.g., "The cat is asleep."
- Both *a priori* and synthetic: the relation is universal and necessary, but the two terms are not identical but rather additive, "informative," e.g., "All causes have effects."
- Empirical causes and effects are externally related. *A priori* relations are internal.
- Constitutive relations are created *within* consciousness alone.
- Causal relations empirically, contingently associate two distinct terms.